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Despite anecdotal instances of far-right extremists exhibiting multiple ideological 
affiliations, the relationship between extremists who adhere to multiple sub-
ideologies and their propensity for violence is unknown. The present study 
contributes to the understanding of how multiple sub-ideologies impact the likelihood 
of violence by using differential association theory to test the hypothesis that far-right 
extremists in the US who adhere to multiple sub-ideologies have a greater propensity 
for extremist violence than single sub-ideology peers. Using data from 922 
individuals who radicalized in the US, logistic regression tests the hypothesis that 
extremists with multiple ideological affiliations will have a greater propensity for 
violence and finds no significant positive relationship. Differences in the amount of 
differential associations may not affect violent outcomes. Moving forward, 
researchers should expand on and refine these findings to address an emerging issue 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Far-right domestic extremism has a long history of violence in the United 
States, tracing back over a century (Chermak et al., 2011; Mudde, 2018; Simi & 
Bubolz, 2017). Research on far-right actors is more critical now than ever as violent 
attacks in recent years draw renewed attention to the changing landscape of domestic 
extremism (Pitcavage, 2019). Although the field of extremism research is evolving, 
the bulk of recent research has focused on Islamist extremism (Doering et al., 2020; 
Silke; 2008). Research on far-right extremism has predominantly focused on the 
broad concepts of far-right ideology, as if all strands of ideology are the same (see 
Chermak et al., 2009; Durham, 2003; Freilich et al., 2015; Mudde, 1995; Simi et al., 
2013), or on individual ideological sub-categories under the far-right concept, such as 
white supremacy (see also Barkun, 1989; Kerodal et al., 2016; Piazza, 2017). No 
existing research of which I am aware has compared far-right extremists who adhere 
to a single ideology and those who profess multiple ideologies in terms of their 
differential propensity for violence. This presents a dearth of literature on the impact 
multiple ideological affiliation has on far-right extremist violence.  
My research examines far-right extremists in the United States with multiple 
ideological affiliations and their propensity for violence. Extremist ideologies provide 
adherents with beliefs and attitudes regarding the world, perceived enemies, and 
justified behaviors that are shared among members of the ideological movement 
(Leader Maynard, 2014). Stated another way, ideology provides extremists with 





far-right domestic extremists in the United States with multiple ideological 
affiliations have a greater propensity for extremist violence than their single ideology 
peers. I define multiple ideologies as when extremists are associated with more than 
one extremist ideology, either concurrently or moving from one ideology to another. 
Single ideology peers are only associated with one ideology.  
Far-right extremism in the United States is characterized by individuals who 
are ideologically motivated by social and political right-leaning issues including 
extreme racism, nationalism, religious radicalism, and anti-government sentiments 
(ADL “Extreme Right”; Piazza, 2017). The far-right sub-ideologies included in my 
research are white supremacy, anti-immigrant, anti-government, militia, Christian 
Identity, and male supremacist, which fall under the broad far-right categorization. 
These sub-ideologies are distinct from one another in their beliefs and norms 
regarding motives, justifications, and targets of extremist violence. I provide a 
summary of each sub-ideology in my literature review to highlight the differences 
between the far-right ideologies.  
Sutherland’s (1939; 1947) differential association theory states that an excess 
of definitions in favor of violence over those unfavorable to violence is associated 
with an increased propensity for violence. My research seeks to understand if 
multiple sub-ideological affiliations provide far-right extremists with more definitions 
favorable to violence, when compared to peers with only one source of violent 
definitions, resulting in an increased propensity for violence.  
Extant research on far-right extremist ideology has acknowledged the 





Holt et al., 2020; Kaplan, 1995; Pitcavage, 2019). The phenomenon of extremists 
with multiple ideologies is garnering more attention in recent years by organizations 
that monitor trends in United States extremism (ADL “Hybrid Hate”; Alcoke, Nov. 
2019). However, to date no other known research has attempted to assess at the 
individual-level whether differences in violent outcomes are influenced by whether 
extremists adhere to multiple sub-ideologies or adhere to only one. My research uses 
differential association theory to explore whether far-right extremists with multiple 
sub-ideologies have a greater propensity for violence when compared to peers with a 
single sub-ideology. There is a shortage of extant research examining individuals with 
multiple ideologies, let alone their relationship to violence and extremism. This 
presents a substantive gap in criminological and terrorism studies background 
literature on the topic. Past research on social movement organizations, which 
includes extremist groups, with multiple ideological affiliations found mixed results 
(for example Heaney & Rojas, 2014; Jung et al., 2014; Olzak, 2016). While Heaney 
and Rojas (2014) and Jung and colleagues (2014) found organizations that 
incorporated multiple ideologies were able to appeal to a larger base of adherents and 
thrive, Olzak (2016) found that singular ideological focus in extremist organizations 
was associated with increased group longevity and violence. My research takes the 
first step to determine if a meaningful relationship exists between extremist violence 
and multiple sub-ideologies among a sample of supporters of the far-right.  
Through my research, I lay out the framework for studying what impact 
multiple sub-ideologies have on a far-right extremist’s propensity for violence. In this 





on known far-right extremists who adhered to multiple sub-ideologies provides initial 
evidence of the phenomenon and the risk of violence presented by the far-right. I 
begin Chapter 2 by reviewing the theoretical literature on differential association 
theory and its application to understand pro-violent attitudes. I argue that differential 
association is useful for understanding how pro-violent intimate peer groups teach 
violent justifications and support to extremists, affecting their propensity for violent 
engagement. I then explore the existing literature on radicalization, the far-right, and 
notable incidences of far-right extremists with multiple sub-ideologies. In the third 
chapter, I describe my methodology, measures, and analytical strategy. My research 
uses the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset 
collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), to study the relationship between multiple ideologies and 
violence. In the final part of Chapter 3, I discuss the data’s limitations and benefits. In 
Chapter 4, I conduct analysis through bivariate correlations and multivariate 
regression. Finally, I summarize my research, findings, limitations, and 
recommendations for future research in Chapter 5.  
Extremism and Ideology 
The FBI defines domestic terrorism as acts “perpetrated by individuals and/or 
groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse 
extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature” 
(Terrorism, FBI www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism). I use the terms terrorist and 
extremist interchangeably in this thesis. There is no federal statute for prosecuting 





protected under the First Amendment until a law is broken. The line between 
domestic extremism and the lawful exercise of hateful activity is thin and determined 
only by whether the ideologically motivated act consists of a crime. This makes the 
study of domestic extremism in the United States difficult because incidents are hard 
to track and may not by publically recognized as extremism. 
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), extreme or far-right 
movements are social, political, and religious right-wing activities that are more 
radical, and therefore outside mainstream conservative movements (ADL “Extreme 
Right”). The ADL identifies the two major branches of the far-right sub-ideology as 
white supremacy and anti-government movements, but also includes ideologies 
focused on narrow beliefs and grievances such as anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim 
sentiments.  
The ADL’s definition of the far-right and its major ideological distinctions is 
just one of many attempts to categorize the far-right (see also Keordal et al., 2016; 
Freilich et al., 2015; Simi et al., 2013). Ideological differences within the broad far-
right movement make up the distinct sub-movements of far-right ideologies. In 
extremism research (Jensen et al., 2016; Onat & Gul, 2018; Piazza, 2009), broad 
ideology umbrella terms are used to categorize different extremist ideologies. The 
most common of these umbrella ideologies are far-right, far-left, single issue, and 
Islamist extremism. Far-left extremism typically consists of ideologies that are class-
oriented and contain Marxist-Leninist beliefs (George & Wilcox, 1996). Far-left 
ideologies support the overthrow of capitalism, which frequently includes the United 





single core belief that transcends far-right or far-left social-political leanings 
(Monaghan, 2000). Single issue movements, such as anti-abortion, are more extreme 
interpretations of mainstream political movements that focus on a single point of 
concern and may transcend political categorizations (ADL “Extreme Right”; 
Monaghan, 2000). Radical Islamist extremism ideology advocates for the imposition 
of shari’a law, the creation of an Islamist state, and rectification of grievances 
affecting Muslims (Hoffman, 2017). Under the broad ideological umbrella terms are 
sub-ideologies, such as white supremacist, sovereign citizen, or militia extremism 
under the far-right umbrella. My research focuses on the effect of multiple sub-
ideologies on a far-right extremist’s propensity for violence. 
Ideology, according to Kruglanski and colleagues (2014), contains an element 
of grievance on behalf of the group, a culprit responsible, and a morally warranted 
and effective method, often violence, to rectify the grievance. It is a belief that 
justifies extremism to right a perceived wrong. Leader Maynard defines extreme 
ideology as “a distinctive system of normative, semantic, and/or reputedly factual 
ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which underpins their 
understandings of their political world and shapes their political behavior” (2014, p. 
824). Succinctly put by Drake, ideology “provides a motive and framework for 
action” (1998, p. 55). These definitions of ideology are explicit regarding how 
extremist ideologies provide adherents with pro-violent definitions, justifications, and 
behavioral scripts for violence against perceived enemies. My research examines 





propensity for violence when compared to single sub-ideology peers as a result of 
excess differential associations in favor of extremist violence.  
Violence and the Far-Right 
Anecdotally, far-right extremists have previously displayed multiple 
ideological affiliations. For example, Eric Rudolph was responsible for a series of 
bombings between 1996 and 1998 in the southern United States. Rudolph was a 
staunch anti-abortion, anti-LGBT extremist affiliated with the Army of God who was 
also associated with the white supremacist militia Christian Identity movement. 
Rudolph’s ideologies all fall under the far-right ideological umbrella, but represent 
different sub-ideologies within the far-right. More recently, Brenton Tarrant, who 
attacked a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, espoused racist, anti-
immigrant, and environmental beliefs, which are typically far-left ideologies, in his 
manifesto. I provide additional cases of multiple ideologies in my literature review 
below. The FBI has observed many younger extremists exhibiting multiple ideologies 
that justify their desire for violence, suggesting these extremists are seeking reasons 
to be violent (Alcoke, Nov. 2019).  
Prominent examples in the media of extremist violence by far-right actors 
with multiple sub-ideologies suggests a concerning emergent trend (ADL “Hybrid 
Hate”), but empirical research is necessary to determine if a significant relationship 
exists. Simi and Bubolz (2017) concluded their overview of the far-right by calling 
for research that explores not only the movement of extremists from one group to 
another, but the study of far-right adherents who hold multiple ideological 





mitigate threats; the first step to accomplishing this as researchers is to determine if a 
phenomenon exists and if it impacts an extremist’s propensity for violence in a 
theoretically expected manner. For that reason, an empirical examination of whether 
adhering to multiple extreme ideologies has an effect on a far-right extremist’s 
propensity for violence is warranted and necessary to better understand the role of 
sub-ideology in extremist violence. Findings that contradict expectations also provide 
value; they highlight gaps in existing theoretical applications of criminology to 
extremism and give insight into extremist ideological behavior. If far-right extremists 
with a single ideological affiliation have a greater propensity for violence than peers 
with multiple ideologies, it may be the result of singular ideological clarity and 
commitment (Olzak, 2016). 
Far-right extremists are a subset of the larger domestic terrorism problem, 
which includes far-left extremism and single issue extremism, but represent a 
significant portion of extremist violence in the United States (Pitcavage, 2019). 
Piazza (2017) found that far-right extremism in the United States was responsible for 
more deaths than any other form of domestic terrorism between 1970-2011. The ADL 
report on United States domestic extremist violence in 2018 found the majority of 
extremist violence incidents were perpetrated by far-right actors (Pitcavage, 2019). 
Furthermore, the ADL reported every extremist murder in 2018 was connected to far-
right ideology (Pitcavage, 2019). According to the ADL, 2018 was the fourth 
deadliest year since 1970 for deaths resulting from domestic terrorism with 50 people 
killed. The years 2015 and 2016 also ranked within the top three deadliest years, 





every United States domestic extremist who committed a murder had ties to far-right 
radical ideology, even if the primary ideology they acted in furtherance of was not 
far-right (Pitcavage, 2019). By focusing solely on far-right individuals, my research 
highlights potential factors related to propensity for violence among an ideological 
group that is now the most violent of any ideological group active in the United 
States. Directly related to this proposed research, one domestic extremist captured by 
the ADL report was a far-right extremist who adopted radical Islamist ideology 
before carrying out his fatal attack. This additional anecdotal evidence supports the 
need for empirical research into what impact multiple ideological affiliations have on 
propensity for violence in domestic extremists. Focusing on far-right extremists is a 
direct response to the increased need for research on domestic terrorism and recent 
publications identifying far-right domestic terrorism as a top terrorism threat to the 
nation (see Barrett, 2019; Bergen & Sterman, 2018; Lowery et al., 2018; Parkin et al., 
2017).  
While past research on individual ideology has used group membership as a 
means of identifying and operationalizing ideology, (Drake, 1998; see Mumford et 
al., 2008 for additional discussion) this measure may no longer be adequate. With 
radicalization occurring increasingly online today and group organizations giving 
way to isolated actors, an individualized approach to ideology is emerging among 
extremists (Doering et al., 2020; Holt et al., 2020; Holt et al., 2019; Pitcavage, 2015; 
Bowman-Grieve, 2009). As such, research must examine how individual or 
competing ideologies affect extremist violence. Far-right research often does not 





broad far-right ideology, studied only a single distinct far-right sub-ideology, or 
examined the primary sub-ideology when two were present (to include Barkun, 1989; 
Chermak et al., 2009; Durham, 2003; Freilich et al., 2015; Kerodal et al., 2016; 
Mudde, 1995; Piazza, 2017; Simi et al., 2013). My research builds on prior research 
by acknowledging the presence of multiple ideological affiliations and examining if, 
compared to individuals with single ideologies, individuals with multiple ideological 
affiliations have an increased propensity for violence.  
Ideology provides standards of behavior for how extremists conduct 
themselves to achieve their goals. I argue that far-right extremists in the United States 
with multiple ideological affiliations will have a greater propensity for violence than 
single ideology peers. The PIRUS data used in this analysis are cross-sectional and 
cannot isolate when in time an extremist adopted more than one set of ideological 
beliefs. The data do not differentiate between individuals with simultaneously held 
ideologies and individuals who experience ideological shift where they move out of 
one ideology to another. Given this limitation, I include both multiple sub-ideologies 
and shifts from one sub-ideology to another as multiple ideology.  
The PIRUS dataset contains 922 far-right individuals and is used to 
understand the relationship between those who adhere to either single or multiple 
extremist ideologies and violence. In Chapter 2, I present the extant research on 
differential association theory and far-right extremism to explain why far-right 
domestic extremists in the United States with multiple ideological affiliations may 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Theoretical Background 
My research uses Sutherland’s differential association theory (DAT) as the 
theoretical lens through which we can understand how individuals can become 
enmeshed in values and norms supporting the use of violence. While my research 
does not attempt to fully test DAT, it is a useful perspective for understanding how 
participation in multiple ideological movements may increase the likelihood of 
violence. Following Sutherland (1939; 1947), I argue that violence is the result of an 
excess of definitions that approve its use as learned within the individual’s peer 
groups. I consider members of ideological communities who adhere to the same 
ideology to be an extremist’s peer group. Therefore, extremists who are affiliated 
with multiple ideologies will be exposed to multiple extremist peer groups.  
Definitions favorable to violence teach individuals the values, attitudes, and 
behaviors supporting the use of violence (Warr & Stafford, 1991). These definitions 
are transmitted through peer groups, and individuals with an excess of violent 
definitions are more likely to use violence than peers who receive more definitions 
unfavorable to the use of violence (Warr & Stafford, 1991). Individuals with an 
excess of definitions favorable to violence are expected to use violence more than 
other forms of deviance as a result of specific attitudes that encourage violence 
(Sutherland, 1947; Thomas, 2018). I argue that extremists with multiple sub-
ideologies may be more exposed to an excess of definitions in favor of extremist 
violence, and therefore more likely to engage in violence than single sub-ideology 





for the relationship between multiple sub-ideology and single sub-ideology 
extremists’ likelihood of violence.  
Edwin Sutherland’s (1939; 1947) differential association theory is a general 
theory of offending where criminal behavior is learned just like any other behavior. 
According to differential association theory, learning criminal behavior is best 
facilitated through intimate peer groups (Sutherland, 1947). Sutherland (1939; 1947) 
posited that offending is a result of attitudes favorable to breaking the law; those 
attitudes are acquired through close interaction with peers who transmit norms 
supportive of criminal behavior. Criminality is learned through interactions and 
communication with people who define the legal code as something to be followed or 
to be violated (Cressey, 1960; Sutherland, 1939; 1947). Therefore, individuals 
become deviant when they have an excess of definitions encouraging violation of the 
law over definitions discouraging violation of the law (Cressey, 1960; Sutherland, 
1939; 1947).  
Differential association is the process of receiving conflicting definitions, with 
one type in excess of the other. Definitions in favor of deviance are acquired through 
interaction with individuals who pass the attitudes and motives in favor of deviance 
through attitude transference (Warr & Stafford, 1991). Criminality results when an 
individual has greater exposure to criminal behavior patterns and is removed from 
non-criminal behavior patterns. This over-exposure to symbolic elements in favor of 
criminality is associated with criminal involvement (McCarthy, 1996; Warr & 
Stafford, 1991). The symbolic elements include the attitudes, motives, and drives that 





needed for criminal action and the symbolic elements are the intervening factors 
between deviant associations and crime, and are key to the differential association 
process (McCarthy, 1996; Sutherland, 1947; Warr & Stafford, 1991). Exposure to 
criminal behavior patterns can vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity 
(Sutherland, 1939; 1947).  
Definitions of crime are often measured as how right or wrong an act is 
perceived to be (Akers, 1994), or by the rationalizations and attitudes toward an act 
(Sutherland, 1947). Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization initially 
attempted to operationalize the definitions used by differential association. 
Neutralizations are beliefs and attitudes which are favorable to and justify crime. 
Akers (1994) in his learning theory further operationalized definitions as 
rationalizations and moral attitudes that evaluate the rightness or wrongness of an act. 
Definitions may be general to moral norms or specific to behaviors. Differential 
social organization describes the alternative learning processes that vary amongst 
groups wherein an individual learns either criminal or conventional methods of 
success (Cressey, 1960; Sutherland, 1939; 1947). Group differences in standards of 
conduct and learned behaviors for achieving success explain differential crime rates 
among groups.  
 Delinquency emerges from interactions with other individuals where a person 
can rationalize delinquency and apply the rationalizations within situational 
circumstances (Sutherland, 1973). Situational rationalizations are used to justify 
deviant behavior in specific circumstances (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Thomas, 2018). 





association theory. The authors posited that differential association theory was an 
attitude formation theory where the influence of attitude transference was the primary 
mechanism through which deviance and criminality were passed along (Warr & 
Stafford, 1991; McCarthy, 1996). Warr and Stafford (1991) found attitudes that affect 
deviance were influenced by the attitudes and behavior of peers. However, the effects 
of attitudes and deviant peers were independent of one another (Warr & Stafford, 
1991; Jensen, 1972). Attitudes are formed around particular crime types and may be 
multi-dimensional, an example being attitudes regarding violence (Sutherland, 1947; 
Thomas, 2018). Therefore, specific attitudes may predict specific behavior such as 
violent attitudes predicting violence (Sutherland, 1947; Thomas, 2018). Jackson and 
colleagues (1986) evaluated whether the differential association process was general 
or specific to given crime types. An excess of definitions in favor of a particular 
crime may predict an increased likelihood of an individual committing that crime.  
Perceived and actual peer group attitudes supporting violence influence the 
violent attitudes and resulting violent behavior of an individual (see Jackson et al., 
1986; Kaczkowski et al., 2020; Mesch et al., 2003; Seddig, 2014; Swahn & Sterling, 
2011). If peers are assessed to view positively and reward violence, an individual is 
more likely to have violent attitudes and be willing to engage in violence. Individuals’ 
pro-violence attitudes are influenced by their peer group association and acceptance 
of pro-violence norms are a strong predictor of violence in adolescence (Boers et al., 
2010; Reed & Rose, 1998; Seddig, 2014). Individuals’ propensity for crime increases 
when they differentially associate with peer groups who engage in criminal behavior 





encouraged and justified within situational contexts. The more an individual’s 
patterns of differential association are skewed toward deviant attitudes, the greater the 
likelihood of that individual engaging in deviance. I argue that among extremists 
already exposed to an excess of extremist definitions, extremists with definitions from 
multiple sub-ideological affiliations will be more likely to engage in extremist 
violence than extremist peers with a single sub-ideological affiliation. 
Differential Association and Extremism 
 Differential association has been previously applied to extremism (Akins & 
Winfree, 2016; Armstrong & Matusitz, 2013; Freiburger & Crane, 2008; Hawdon, 
2012; Pauwels & Schils 2016; Reinares et al., 2017). Armstrong and Mausitz (2013) 
in a conceptual, non-data driven, examination of Hezbollah argued that differential 
association could explain how violence is learned within extremist groups. Extremist 
ideologies are exclusionary and clearly delineate in and out groups to guide adherent 
behavior and indoctrination (Akerman et al., 2017). Sageman (2004) argues that 
extremist ideological movements are built around creating in-groups violently 
opposed to out-groups. Individuals in ideological communities are cloistered with 
those who share their ideology and are inundated with definitions in favor of 
extremist violence while cut off from definitions opposed to extremist violence (see 
Futrell & Simi, 2004; Hawdon, 2012; Sageman, 2004). Extremist attitudes supportive 
of violence are reinforced through exclusive interaction with peer groups that share 
violent attitudes. This validates attitudes regarding the necessity of violence and 
approval from the in-group when violence is used, leading to a higher likelihood of 





that ideological movements constitute peer groups that share definitions supportive of 
violence; participation in more than one extreme ideological groups exposes an 
extremist to multiple sources of violent definitions. 
The greater the number of definitions favorable to extremist violence, the 
greater the likelihood an individual will engage in violent extremism (Akers & 
Sellers, 2004). I argue that exposure to and reinforcement of extremist attitudes in 
favor of violence from multiple extremist sub-ideologies will be associated with a 
greater propensity for extremist violence than exposure to only one ideological source 
of extremist attitudes in favor of violence.  
The role of attitudes favoring violence and violent behavior in extremism 
remains unclear as most extremists hold ideological attitudes in favor of violence yet 
refrain from engaging in violent behavior (Khalil et al., 2019; Kaczkowski et al., 
2020). Kaczkowski and colleagues (2020) found that peers with attitudes supportive 
of violence increased an extremist’s support for violence and willingness to engage in 
extremist violence. Even among lone actors, who may have weak or discontinuous 
social ties with ideological communities, exposure to ideological sources of 
encouragement and justification for violence was part of the process for overcoming 
moral objections to the use of extremist violence (Schuurman et al., 2018; Schuurman 
et al., 2019). Schuurman et al. (2018) argued that social ties critical to the 
development of motivations and behaviors are needed for engagement in extremist 
violence (see also Schuurman et al., 2019). I posit far-right extremists who interact 
with extremist communities from more than one sub-ideological affiliation may 





individuals with a single sub-ideological affiliation. This may result in extremists 
with multiple sub-ideological affiliations having a greater propensity for violence 
than single sub-ideology extremists.  
According to Bruinsma (1992), the more contact an individual had with 
deviant peer groups, the greater the effect their peers’ deviancy had on the creation 
and communication of positive definitions of deviance. I apply these findings to my 
research and argue that extremists affiliated with multiple sub-ideologies may 
experience greater contact with deviant behavior, and therefore receive a greater 
amount of pro-violent attitudes, than extremists affiliated with one sub-ideology. 
Additionally, extremists with multiple ideological affiliations may identify strongly 
with multiple peer groups, resulting in a stronger peer effect than that of extremists 
who strongly identify with only one extremist peer group. Examinations of extremist 
social networks have found intimate peer groups with other extremists were related to 
increased propensity for extremist violence (see Doering et al., 2020; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2014). I argue that extremists who adhere to multiple ideologies will 
have denser intimate peer social networks, will have more contact with pro-violent 
definitions, and therefore will be more likely to engage in extremist violence than 
single ideology extremists.  
According to Sullivan and colleagues (2019), feelings of grievance or 
oppression can motivate extremists to connect with others who hold similar beliefs, 
indoctrinating the extremist further into their ideological beliefs and increasing their 
propensity for extremist violence. When extremists select multiple ideologies to 





one to another, they create a personalized ideological experience. Hawdon (2012) 
found that personalization of ideological influences limited both social networks and 
exposure to definitions that conflict with those in favor of extremist violence. 
Immersion in networks of likeminded extremists that reject any viewpoints counter to 
their own causes individuals to experience greater frequency, duration, and intensity 
of definitions favorable to extremist violence (Hawdon, 2012; Pauwels & Schils, 
2016). According to Futrell & Simi (2004), far-right extremists often create isolated 
communities where they can communicate and reinforce their ideology and collective 
identity away from counter-narratives. This limits exposure to conflicting definitions 
that weaken the effect of differential association in favor of violence. I argue that far-
right extremists who adhere to multiple ideologies will be exposed to multiple 
isolated ideological communities, further limiting their exposure to counter-
definitions when compared to single ideology peers, and will therefore have a greater 
propensity for violence. 
Diverse social networks moderate the effect of definitions in favor of 
violence; the more diverse social domains an extremist is a part of, the more protected 
they are from peer attitudes supporting violence (see Kaczkowski et al., 2020; 
Quintelier et al., 2012; Putnam, 2000). Diverse social networks present a wider array 
of differential associations, potentially those opposed to the use of extremist violence, 
than homogenous social networks. I argue that extremist ideological movements are 
not diverse in that adherents share extreme beliefs supporting violence and 
participation in multiple ideological movements result in homogenous social 





to the violent attitudes of their ideological affiliation. Conversely, extremists with 
homogeneous social networks, especially those associated with multiple extremist 
ideological communities advocating for the use of violence, may be more susceptible 
to adopting those attitudes as their own and engaging in violence given the excess of 
definitions in favor of violent extremism.   
I argue that individuals involved in extremist ideological movements interact 
with likeminded individuals, creating a feedback loop of definitions in favor of 
extremist violence. The communication within these ideological communities occurs 
verbally and non-verbally, with extremists instructing and learning from each other 
(Sutherland, 1947). Past acts of violence are celebrated and idealizations of violence 
are rewarded. Put together, extreme ideological movements foster environments 
where attitudes, rationalizations, techniques, and motives of violence are frequent, 
intense, and presented for long durations. I argue that if an extremist participates in 
more than one sub-ideological movement, they are exposed to a greater amount and 
variation of definitions in favor of violence, and therefore the extremist may be more 
likely to engage in extremist violence than an extremist peer who participates in only 
one sub-ideological movement. 
I use differential association theory to demonstrate how ideology functions as 
a set of beliefs and attitudes that make violence permissible and necessary. From that 
perspective, differential association can answer the question of whether extremists 
who are exposed to multiple sets of excessive pro-violence definitions through 
participation in multiple ideologies are more likely to engage in extremist violence 





favorable to extremist violence multiple and single ideology extremists are exposed to 
may explain differences in violent mobilization. I use PIRUS data to test my 
hypothesis that far-right extremists with more than one ideological affiliation will 
have a greater propensity for violence than peers with a single ideological affiliation. 
Extremism Empirical Literature 
The adoption of ideology is a cognitive function of, and a key element in, 
radicalization, yet how ideology relates to violence remains murky (see discussion by 
Kruglanski et al., 2009; 2014). Radicalization is an individualized process wherein 
internal and external factors inform the individual’s pathway into extremism 
(Kruglanski et al., 2014). Kruglanski and colleagues’ (2019) “3N” approach of need, 
narrative, and network factors posit that radicalization ensues when one need exceeds 
all others to the point of single-minded action. Narratives provide an ideological 
roadmap of action to obtaining the need and the network is the social reference group 
to justify and provide the desired need to extremists who mobilize to action. The 
following literature review provides an overview of the far-right, major far-right 
ideologies, and existing literature and discussion on multiple extremist ideologies.  
Far-Right Ideology 
The far-right in the United States exists as a network of groups and ideologies 
that often combine nationalistic, racist, anti-government, and xenophobic beliefs 
(Balleck, 2018; George & Wilcox, 1996; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; Simi & Bubolz, 
2017). Freilich and colleagues (2009) characterize the far-right as being comprised of 





the Ku Klux Klan, Atomwaffen Division, Oath Keepers, and Christian Identity. 
Informal United States movements include racist skinheads, neo-fascists, and anti-
government militias. The far-right is known to use both legitimate and illegitimate 
methods to obtain the goals of each movement. Legitimate, non-violent means of 
influence include political organization, legal protest, and publishing extremist 
literature. Illegitimate actions include assault or murder of perceived enemy groups, 
vandalism, bombings, and tax evasion (Simi & Bubolz, 2017). Noted previously 
(Abanes, 1996; George & Wilcox, 1996; Kerodal et al., 2016; Simi & Bubolz, 2017), 
there are frequent overlaps in the ideologies of far-right extremist groups. However, 
not all far-right extremists belong to groups, nor do they always stay in groups. The 
umbrella term far-right is used to encompass the many sub-ideologies within the far-
right. The importance of ideology, or lack thereof, is yet to be fully examined and 
could shed additional light on the underlying factors that make far-right extremism as 
serious as it is in the United States.   
The modern conception of far-right groups and ideologies in the United States 
rose to prominence following the advent of the civil rights movement with historical 
roots tracing back nearly a century (see discussion by Chermak et al., 2011; Mudde, 
2018; Simi & Bubolz, 2017). Nationalistic, racist, and anti-government sentiments 
were a response to perceived government overreach. Historically, categorizations of 
far-right ideology have varied with disagreement whether to classify based on group, 
belief system, or behavior (Barkun, 1989; Durham, 2003; Kaplan, 1995). A literature 
review of over 300 articles by Gruenewald and colleagues (2009) that discussed the 





far-right were comprised of conspiracy theories and xenophobic, anti-government, 
anti-tax, survivalist, and anti-gun control beliefs. Chermak et al. (2013) describe the 
United States far-right as extremists who justify the use of violence to achieve an 
idealized future for their exclusive group-based identity. These group identities are 
often formed along racial, nationalistic, or niche interests and have a deep skepticism 
for federal and liberal governments (Chermak et al., 2013). Balleck (2018) asserts far-
right extremists desire a return to an idealized past when privileged identities held 
undisputed power in society. A factor analysis by Kerodal et al. (2016) to determine a 
reliable typology for far-right extremists identified four distinct categories of 
ideology: conspiracy theorist, survivalist, movement participant, and proud far-
rightist.  
Despite the disagreements on where the broad categorical divides occur in the 
far-right, my research treats each sub-ideology as its own distinct ideology with 
unique customs, norms, and pro-violent values (Kruglanski et al., 2014; Leader 
Maynard, 2014; PIRUS, 2017). Those ideologies are white supremacy, anti-
immigrant, anti-government, militia, Christian Identity, and male supremacist. Anti-
abortion, anti-LGBT, and anti-Muslim ideologies are classified as single issue 
ideologies (ADL “Extreme Right”), but overlap with far-right ideologies. Under the 
umbrella ideology of the far-right, each unique ideology can be viewed as a sub-
ideology (Ulusoy & Firat, 2018). Far-right extremist ideologies are not mutually 
exclusive in what they believe or who they hate (see Abanes, 1996; Balleck, 2018; 
George & Wilcox, 1996; Kerodal et al., 2016; Simi & Bubolz, 2017). Instead, what 





methods for achieving the ideology’s desired political or social outcomes. Stated 
differently, the ideologies of the far-right are differentiated by their primary 
objectives, primary perceived oppressor, and the approved methods of opposition. In 
the following section, I describe the major ideological sub-categories of the far-right. 
Ideological Sub-Categories of the Far-Right 
White Supremacy 
White supremacy is a broad extremist ideology that contains multiple sub-
ideologies that vary in their particular values, goals, and justifications for violence. 
Various sects of white supremacist ideology include the neo-Nazi, racist skinhead, 
KKK, and neo-Confederate sub-movements. However, central to all the movements 
is the core belief that white identity and culture is superior to other races and 
ethnicities, and should be preserved at all costs (SPLC “White Nationalist”; ADL 
“White Supremacy”). Frequently, the key to achieving this goal is through the 
creation of a white ethnostate following a racial civil war or the destruction of non-
whites and Jews (Balleck, 2018). Adherents may believe that the white race is on the 
verge of extinction, justifying the use of violence to “save” the white race (ADL 
“White Supremacy”). Furthermore, anti-Semitic conspiracies and rhetoric feature in 
nearly every white supremacist sub-movement (Balleck, 2018). White supremacist 
ideological material, such as the manifestos of other extremists or books like Siege 
and The Turner Diaries, provide pathways and justifications for extremist violence 
(ADL, 16 April 2019; Balleck, 2018; McAlear, 2009). These materials are shared 





use violence against perceived enemies, and explicitly convey that violence must be 
used against non-whites and Jews.  
Anti-Immigrant 
Xenophobic, or anti-immigrant, extremist ideology adherents oppose 
immigration from non-white nations, making them closely related to white 
supremacist extremists (Balleck, 2018). Anti-immigrant extremists’ main focus is 
preventing immigration from countries that would jeopardize the white Christian 
majority of the United States (Balleck, 2018; SPLC “Anti-Immigrant”, “Anti-
Muslim”). This takes the form of bigotry and racism against Hispanics and Muslims 
in particular. Despite the racist roots of anti-immigrant ideology, these extremists 
characterize themselves as not necessarily wanting to destroy other races, but wanting 
to keep them out of the United States and are willing to use violence to do so 
(Balleck, 2018). A fine line of distinction, but one that makes anti-immigrant 
extremist ideologies different from white supremacist ideologies is their goals and 
perceived oppressors. Anti-immigrant extremists want to prevent immigration from 
non-white countries and target immigrant minorities, while white supremacists target 
non-white and Jewish people regardless of national origin. Anti-immigrant extremists 
may use pseudo-political organizations and movements, such as the Center for 
Immigration Studies and VDARE, to legitimize their beliefs, but some adherents have 






The broad anti-government movement is characterized by two main 
ideological divides; anti-government “common-law” groups and militias (Balleck, 
2018; SPLC “Antigovernment”). Broadly, both types of anti-government extremist 
ideologies claim that government violence is imminent and citizens should prepare 
for revolution. Conspiracy theories, which are often racist and anti-Semitic, and pro-
Second Amendment attitudes are rife in extremist anti-government ideologies 
(Balleck, 2018). These attitudes feed into beliefs that adherents must be well armed 
and trained in paramilitary tactics to protect citizens from the government. Anti-
government conspiracy theories create a sense of urgency that can motivate 
extremists to crime, including violence (Sullivan et al., 2019; Freilich & Pridemore, 
2005). The difference between militias and general anti-government ideologies are 
their organization and granular beliefs.  
Examples of common-law anti-government ideological movements are anti-
tax extremists and the emerging boogaloo adherents. Anti-tax extremists use alternate 
conceptions of the United States Constitution and tax law as justification for not 
following the law (Sullivan et al., 2019). Anti-tax extremists believe they are 
oppressed by the government, which is illegitimate and illegally imposing taxes on 
citizens (Balleck, 2018; Sullivan et al., 2019). Sovereign citizens comprise a sub-
ideology of the anti-government anti-tax ideology who believe they are exempt from 
obeying the law and paying taxes. These extremists believe they are a sovereign 
person free from government control or belong to a fictitious state (Sullivan et al., 





courts, but have engaged in extremist violence when confronted by government 
entities (Sullivan et al., 2019; SPLC “Sovereign Citizens”). Boogaloo refers to an 
impending civil war that will lead to governmental collapse, a future that anti-
government boogaloo adherents actively encourage (ADL “Boogaloo”). Boogaloo 
extremists tout a range of beliefs including anti-gun control, survivalist, anarcho-
capitalist, and white supremacist (ADL, 26 Nov. 2019). Boogaloo is used to 
encompass a range of beliefs that explicitly support violence against the government, 
particularly law enforcement (Newhouse & Gunesch, 2020). While some militia or 
white supremacist extremists may endorse boogaloo beliefs, the majority of boogaloo 
adherents are primarily opposed to authority and want to bring about the end of 
government.    
Militia 
Extremists who adhere to anti-government ideology and participate in militias 
are more focused on paramilitary organization and firearms in order to prepare for 
governmental collapse or overreach (ADL “Militia Movement”; Balleck, 2018). 
Modern paramilitary militias and patriot groups emerged in the mid-1990s following 
fatal federal law enforcement encounters in Waco and Ruby Ridge and in response to 
gun rights legislation (Freilich & Pridemore, 2005; Hamm, 1997). Militias tend to be 
more formally organized than peers who adhere to a more general anti-government 
ideology. Past research has defined militia extremism as a group that uses 
paramilitary tactics, charismatic leaders, and social networks to encourage adherents 
to oppose the federal government, multinational organizations, and international 





O’Brien, 1997; Van Dyke & Soule, 2002). Militia extremists believe they are exempt 
from government control, which is often viewed as illegitimate, and must oppose the 
government when it becomes tyrannical (ADL “Militia Movement”; Balleck, 2018). 
Adherents oppose centralized government, federal bureaucracy and overreach, land 
use regulations, and taxes (Freilich & Pridemore, 2005). Many of the anti-government 
sentiments held by militia extremists are fueled by fears of the government enacting 
gun control and taking away the right to bear arms. Militia ideology encourages 
adherents to stockpile weapons, train, and fight back against governmental 
oppression. Despite overlap with racist and other extreme ideologies, anti-
government militias are predominantly focused on opposing the government and 
conspiracy theories (ADL “Militia Movement”). An example of militia violent 
engagement is when militia groups will mobilize to protect “victims” from 
government overreach, implicitly and explicitly threatening violence. Two notable 
anti-government militia movements are the Three Percenters and Oath Keepers (ADL 
“Oath Keepers”).   
Christian Identity 
Christian Identity extremism is an ideological blend of anti-government 
militia and white supremacist beliefs, which makes it unique from both parent 
ideologies (ADL “Christian Identity;” SPLC “Christian Identity”). Adherents of 
Christian Identity believe whites are the “lost tribes of Israel,” and Jews and non-
white people are less than human. The ideology is deeply anti-Semitic and racist with 
conspiratorial anti-government sentiments couched in religious absolutism. Christian 





racial battle. During the apocalypse, global institutions will be destroyed and thus 
adherents distrust the government, believing it to be run by Jews, and hold themselves 
accountable to “God’s laws.” Some Christian Identity adherents will retreat from 
society to create secluded communities where they can become enmeshed in their 
ideology away from counter-narratives (Balleck, 2018). There is notable crossover of 
white supremacist and militia extremists who adopted the Christian Identity faith, but 
often these converts remain primarily white supremacists or militia extremists (ADL 
“Christian Identity”).  
Male Supremacist 
Male supremacist extremists, commonly referred to as involuntary celibates, 
or incels, represent a far-right extremist ideology that has emerged over the past 
decade (Hoffman et al., 2020). Incels, who are generally young men, believe they are 
socially disadvantaged due to genetic determinism and as a result, are denied female 
sexual attention. The incel ideology connects disenfranchised adherents in loose 
networks, predominantly online, where grievances against society and females can be 
aired in an ideological echo chamber. Key to incel extremism is the open support for 
violence against and revenge on females and other perceived societal oppressors 
(Baele et al., 2019; Beauchamp, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). Extremists who adhere 
to incel ideology blame neo-liberalism, feminism, and immigration as the source of 
their grievances, tying incels close to peers in other far-right ideologies (ADL, 2018; 
Gilmore, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). Incel extremist violence has targeted women, 
who are blamed for being sexually selective, and men who are perceived as more 





supremacist extremist ideology propagates the belief that females are inferior to 
males and should be violently subjugated (SPLC “Male Supremacy”).  
Anti-Abortion & Anti-LGBT 
Anti-abortion and anti-LGBT extremist ideologies skirt the territory between 
being categorized as far-right sub-ideologies and single issue ideologies (ADL, 2015; 
Balleck, 2018). I consider these ideologies to be single-issue in my research because 
they are focused on a single topic and do not align with the characteristics of far-right 
ideologies, which are broadly racist and skeptical of government. Anti-abortion and 
anti-LGBT extremist ideologies are both considered religious ideologies as adherents 
use radical Christianity to justify their beliefs and violence (Balleck, 2018). Anti-
abortion extremist ideology is based in the religious or moral belief that violence is 
justified to stop abortions and abortion providers to save the lives of unborn children 
(ADL, 2015; ADL, 2012). Extremists who adhere to anti-LGBT ideologies believe 
that members of the LGBT community are dangerous and that there is a 
conspiratorial “homosexual agenda” that will destroy Christianity and society (SPLC 
“Anti-LGBTQ”). Adherents of anti-LGBT extremist ideologies typically engage in 
public defamation of the LGBT community, but support and advocate for anti-LGBT 
hate crimes and violent attacks (Balleck, 2018). 
The Far-Right and Multiple Ideologies  
A difficult aspect when studying terrorism, particularly domestic, is how 
rapidly the field changes. With the advent of social media and the Internet as a 





the rate of radicalization has increased (Alcoke, Nov. 2019; Jensen et al., 2018b). 
This changing landscape makes current and rigorous research vital to researchers and 
policy makers. Work examining often overlooked population subsets, such as 
domestic terrorism and ideological adherence dynamics, push the bounds of terrorism 
research further. Past research has overlooked the often confusing phenomenon of 
multiple or customized ideologies when studying terrorism.  
At the time of my research, only a handful of articles acknowledged multiple 
sub-ideologies among far-right extremists, however in these examinations, the 
ideology was either classified under the primary belief set or as “other” (see Strang & 
Sun, 2017; Ellis et al., 2016; Kerodal et al., 2016; Kaplan, 1995). Balleck (2018) 
acknowledges the interconnectedness of far-right sub-ideologies, remarking that 
adherents rarely fit into a single ideological box and may hold multiple sub-ideologies 
at once or multiple points in time. Kaplan (1995) acknowledged a trend in far-right 
ideologies of serial or simultaneous membership in more than one belief system, but 
focused on group differences in violence. In creating a factor analysis of commitment 
to far-right extremism, Kerodal et al. (2016) attempted to capture multiple ideological 
beliefs as a sign of increased commitment to far right ideologies, but did not push 
their analysis further. 
Anecdotal evidence pulled from the headlines corroborates the existence of 
extremist participation in multiple ideologies. What is yet unknown is if these 
instances represent a new trend in far-right violence. In 2018, a Washington DC 
Metro Transit Police officer was convicted of terrorist financing charges after sending 





himself to ISIS, the officer adhered to white supremacy ideology through 
participation in Nazi officer reenactments, Nazi tattoos, and neo-Nazi literature 
(Weiner, 23 Feb. 2018). The Atlanta Centennial Olympic Park bomber, Eric Rudolph, 
allegedly held both anti-abortion and anti-government white supremacist beliefs as 
evidenced through his affiliation with the Army of God and multiple white 
supremacist groups including Christian Identity and Aryan Nation (The Washington 
Post, 12 Dec. 1998). Rudolph was labeled a lone wolf domestic extremist who crafted 
his ideology to fit his own idiosyncratic worldview, pulling heavily from far-right 
beliefs such as anti-government and xenophobia (Mockaitis, 2019).  
In early 2017, a member of the Atomwaffen Division, a notoriously violent 
neo-Nazi terrorist group, committed a double murder after converting to Islam and 
pledging support to ISIS (Thompson, Nov. 2018). The Atomwaffen Division 
ideology incorporates tenants of accelerationism, which calls for the destruction of 
modern society by any means including supporting diametrically opposed beliefs to 
sow chaos and destruction (Beauchamp, Nov. 2019). Accelerationism has gained 
traction as a far-right tactic, where extremists work toward the complete destruction 
of modern society, and frequently incorporate elements from other ideologies, such as 
anti-government beliefs, to further the likelihood of chaos (ADL, 16 April 2019).  
Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch, New Zealand mosque shooter, described 
himself in his manifesto as an eco-fascist who used the ongoing existential threat of 
climate change to justify racist, nationalistic beliefs (Kaufman, Aug. 2019). The 
traditional stance of the political right and far-right on climate change has been 





with authoritarian, fascist responses to the crisis (Forchter, 2019). These prominent 
examples of violence perpetrated by far-right extremists with multiple ideologies 
demand empirical research that quantitatively examines the existence of the anecdotal 





Chapter 3: Methods 
Data 
Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) is an open 
source and publicly available dataset compiled by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) that currently houses cross-
sectional, individual-level data on over 2,100 extremists. The data collection scope 
ranges from 1948 through 2017. Individuals within the dataset have engaged in 
violent or non-violent criminal activity on behalf of their ideology, categorized 
broadly as Far Right, Far Left, Islamist, or Single Issue. PIRUS data were extracted 
from public sources and include information on extremist background, demographics, 
and group affiliation (PIRUS; Jensen et al., 2017). Researchers collected the initial 
data in three waves between early 2013 and mid-2014 and pulled from sources such 
as court documents, online news sites, news archives, government and 
nongovernment open-source reports, and extant terrorism datasets (LaFree et al., 
2018). From these sources, nearly 3,700 extremists were identified and assessed 
against the inclusion criteria, for a total of 1,473 individuals included in the dataset. 
Since the initial data collection, by 2017 over 700 additional extremists have been 
added to PIRUS.  
To be included in PIRUS an individual must have a known ideological 
motivation for extremist behavior and been radicalized in the United States. PIRUS 
inclusion criteria require evidence that the extremist behavior is linked to the ideology 
of the individual. This includes not only those arrested for, indicted, or killed as a 





and were affiliated with extremist groups where leaders were arrested for a violent 
ideological crime. Evidence of radicalization is defined in PIRUS as those who were 
arrested, indicted, or convicted of criminal ideological extremist behavior. This 
definition also includes those who were planning criminal extremist acts, but 
mandates there be a clear connection between the individual and the attempted act. 
The dataset focuses on domestic radicalization within the United States, therefore the 
origins and bulk of radicalization must occur inside the United States to be included. 
PIRUS does not include individuals traveling to the United States to commit 
extremism, but does include those who leave the United States to attend terrorist 
training camps as they are assumed to already be radicalized.  
PIRUS researchers randomly sampled the initial individuals assessed to meet 
the inclusion criteria and coded them for the 147 variables within the dataset. 
Variables measured by PIRUS include individual background, ideological, and 
radicalization information, all of which precede the individual’s mobilization to 
extremist activity. Following the initial sample coding, researchers conducted three 
waves of sampling and coding individuals who met the inclusion criteria. Reliability 
was ensured by double-coding approximately ten percent of included individuals and 
the use of Krippendorf’s alpha procedure to test for inter-rater reliability. The data 
was assessed to be reliable at the 0.7 standard with each wave of data collection 
improving the coding practices (Jensen et al., 2016).   
Ideology is broadly captured by PIRUS as four dichotomous and mutually 
exclusive measures: far-right, far-left, radical Islamist, or single-issue. These are the 





extremist can have multiple. An extremist is included in PIRUS if there is evidence 
that their behavior was linked to the ideology with which they were associated. I 
restrict the scope of this study to individuals who became radicalized as far-right 
extremists. According to the PIRUS codebook, the far-right includes extremists who 
generally are ideologically opposed to the federal government and leftist politics. 
Often this is expressed through groups and individuals who are racially extreme, tax 
and government protestors, gun rights extremists, and survivalist or anti-government 
militias (PIRUS, 2017; Chermak et al., 2011). This is a broad categorization with a 
wide degree of variability in group structure and ideological precepts. Despite being 
distinct, these ideologies can experience ideological cross-over (George & Wilcox, 
1996). PIRUS contains 922 individuals identified as far-right radical extremists.  
Data were collected after a potential extremist was identified and open source 
research determined if they were eligible for inclusion in the dataset. Therefore, 
extremists who were never publicly identified were not captured within PIRUS. The 
open source nature of PIRUS data makes the amount and veracity of information 
available dependent on the validity of the print and electronic media examined. If a 
relevant variable was not explicitly mentioned in the source, the PIRUS team treated 
it as missing. The target population is all far-right domestic terrorists in the United 
States, however this is precluded by the nature of the PIRUS data. Instead, the sample 
consists of far-right extremists who were publicly identified as a result of their radical 
mobilization or public affiliation with known terrorists. The PIRUS data exclude far-
right ideological adherents who were not identified as extremists or caught for their 





in the United States, but trends in open source reporting, such as greater coverage on 
violence (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006) and ideologies that draw media attention 
(LaFree et al., 2018), may result in data that reflect those trends.  
Measures 
In Table 1, I list all variables included in the analysis and report the proportion 
of missing observations for each variable. I test the hypothesized relationship with the 
dependent variable, “Violent,” and the independent variable, “Multiple Ideology,” in 
addition to various control variables. The following section describes the variables 
and their importance.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables 








Violent 0 No 39.26% 922 0.489 0 
 1 Yes 60.74%    
Multiple Ideology 0 No 81.76% 922 0.391 0 
 1 Yes 18.76%    
Mental Health 0 No 86.98% 922 0.337 0 
 1 Yes 13.02%    
Radical Friends 0 No 8.97% 435 0.286 52.82 
 1 Yes 91.03%    
Previous Criminal Activity  0 No 46.81% 502 0.499 45.55 
 1 Yes 53.19%    
Stable Employment 0 No 36.42% 313 0.482 66.05 
 1 Yes 63.58%    
Male 0 No 5.64% 922 0.231 0 
 1 Yes 94.36%    
White 0 No 4.63% 863 0.21 6.4 
 1 Yes 95.37%    






The dependent variable, “Violent,” measures whether extremist violent 
behavior was perpetrated or attempted as measured through PIRUS. “Violent” is a 
dichotomous measure where violence includes behaviors that resulted in actual 
injuries or fatalities, the failed intent to cause injury or fatality, or being criminally 
charged with conspiracy to injure or cause fatalities, even if apprehended while 
plotting. This measure is the individual’s first reported, ideologically-motivated, 
activity that is recorded by authorities or the media. To be included in PIRUS, 
extremists had to be identified as extremists, either through their own actions or their 
associations. This makes inclusion dependent on an outcome measure, reversing the 
causal order of the data. Coders of PIRUS then work backwards in an extremist’s life 
history to identify information for PIRUS variables. My analysis examines violent 
and non-violent outcomes among a sample of extremists publically identified for their 
ideological behavior and affiliations. I do not attempt to make claims about extremists 
who engage in extremist activity and those who do no.  
Examples of violent behaviors are murder, assault, kidnapping, bombings, and 
arson with intent to harm. A little over half of the sampled far-right extremists 
engaged in violence. Nonviolent outcomes include behaviors such as property 
destruction, illegal protest, incitement of violence, and tax fraud. This variable is 
based on the extremist’s earliest public exposure which resulted in their identification 
as a terrorist (LaFree et al., 2018).  
The independent variable, “Multiple Ideology,” measures an extremist’s 
ideological sub-categories. My research pulls the sample of domestic extremists from 





with no possibility for individuals to be placed in more than one broad ideological 
category. Therefore, to examine multiple ideology, a dichotomous variable, “Multiple 
Ideology,” was generated from three mutually exclusive variables in PIRUS that 
capture extremist ideological sub-categories. Tables 2.1 through 2.3 list the 
distribution of sub-categories for the 922 far-right extremists included in the sample. 
In my sample, the single case of other ideology was anti-Muslim single issue 
extremism (Smith, 14 Oct. 2016). These sub-categories make distinct the major 
extremist ideologies in PIRUS. The majority of ideological combinations were of 
multiple far-right sub-ideologies or the single issue ideologies anti-LGBT and anti-
abortion. Conceptually, an extremist classified as far-right in PIRUS could have one 
ideological subcategory of white supremacist with a second or third ideological 
subcategory of environmentalist or Islamist, however that does not occur in my 
sample. 
Table 2.1. Ideological Sub-Categories for Single Ideology Extremists 
Single Ideology N % 
White Supremacist 495 66.09 
Anti-Immigrant 49 6.54 
Anti-Government 173 23.1 
Militia 27 3.6 
Christian Identity 4 0.53 
Male Supremacist 1 0.13 












Table 2.2. Ideological Combinations for Extremists with Two Ideologies 
Primary/Secondary N % 
White Supremacist/Anti-Immigrant 17 11.56 
White Supremacist/Anti-Government 26 17.69 
White Supremacist/Christian Identity 24 16.33 
White Supremacist/Anti-LGBT 8 5.44 
Anti-Immigrant/White Supremacist 3 2.04 
Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Government 4 2.72 
Anti-Government/White Supremacist 2 1.36 
Anti-Government/Anti-Immigrant 1 0.68 
Anti-Government/Militia 11 7.48 
Anti-Government/Christian Identity 6 4.08 
Anti-Government/Anti-LGBT 1 0.68 
Militia/White Supremacist 1 0.68 
Militia/Anti-Immigrant 1 0.68 
Militia/Anti-Government 33 22.45 
Militia/Christian Identity 2 1.36 
Militia/Cult 1 0.68 
Christian Identity/White Supremacist 4 2.72 
Christian Identity/Anti-Immigrant 1 0.68 
Christian Identity/Anti-Government 1 0.68 
Total 147 100 
Table 2.3. Ideological Combinations for Extremists with Three Ideologies 
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary N % 
White Supremacist/Militia/Christian Identity  1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Government 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Immigrant/Christian Identity 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Abortion 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Immigrant/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Government/Militia 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Government/Christian Identity 2 7.69 
White Supremacist/Anti-Government/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Christian Identity/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Abortion/Christian Identity 1 3.85 
White Supremacist/Anti-Abortion/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Government/Anti-Muslim 1 3.85 
Anti-Government/Anti-Immigrant/Christian Identity 1 3.85 
Militia/White Supremacist/Anti-Government 3 11.54 
Militia/Anti-Immigrant/Anti-Government 1 3.85 
Militia/Anti-Immigrant/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
Militia/Anti-Government/White Supremacist 2 7.69 
Militia/Christian Identity/Anti-Abortion 1 3.85 
Militia/Anti-LGBT/Anti-Government 1 3.85 
Christian Identity/Anti-Government/White Supremacist 1 3.85 
Christian Identity/Anti-Abortion/Anti-LGBT 1 3.85 
Christian Identity/Anti-LGBT/Anti-Abortion 1 3.85 






The 749 individuals who only have one ideological sub-category attributed to 
them are the reference group and are considered to be single ideology. Single 
ideology individuals adhere to one set of ideological beliefs from an established 
ideological milieu with values and norms supporting violence. “Multiple Ideology” 
captures if a far-right extremist is associated with more than one ideological sub-
category. In PIRUS, an individual can have a maximum of three distinct ideological 
sub-categories attributed to them. Of the identified sample, 147 individuals had two 
ideologies and 26 individuals had three ideologies associated with them at the time of 
data collection. A total of 173 extremists within the sample have multiple ideological 
affiliations, comprising approximately 19 percent of the sample. The sub-category 
variables are categorical measures with up to 19 ideologies available.   
Control Variables 
My model’s control measures, listed above in Table 1, include known 
correlates of violent extremism and demographic variables. I use the control variables 
peers, criminal history, stable employment, and mental health to examine potentially 
confounding elements that could impact the relationship between multiple ideologies 
and violence. The earlier study of PIRUS data by LaFree et al. (2018) found that 
employment, radical peers, criminal history, and a history of mental illness were 
significantly related to violent extremism. Jasko et al.’s (2017) peer affiliation 
research, also using PIRUS data, found that individuals with extremist peers have a 
higher propensity for terrorist violence. If a person has multiple sub-ideologies, it is 





given their participation in multiple ideological communities. While peers are part of 
differential association theory, my research focuses on the impact of multiple sources 
of excess definitions favorable to violence from multiple sub-ideologies, not multiple 
sources of peers. Therefore, controlling for peers will allow for discernment of what 
the true relationship is between multiple ideological affiliations and violence. 
Furthermore, Kerodal et al. (2016) suggest the possibility that social ties within the 
far-right may be stronger than ideological bonds. I measure peer affiliation with the 
dichotomous variable of radical friends, which asks if the individual had a close 
friend involved in radical activities or not.  
In my research, previous criminal history is a dichotomous variable. 
According to Table 1, roughly half of the sample had a previous criminal history. 
Individuals with criminal histories prior to radicalization were nearly twice as likely 
to commit violent acts of extremism than peers without and over half of sampled far-
right extremists had a criminal history (Jensen et al., 2018).  
Mental health is a dichotomous measure where an extremist either has no 
known previous history of mental health issues, or there is some evidence of past 
mental health. Past research by Gruenewald and colleagues (2013) on far-right 
extremists and mental health found that lone actors were more likely to have a history 
of mental illness compared to far-right extremists who did not act alone. While the 
relationship between mental illness and extremism is not fully known, criminological 
literature and research on correlates of violent extremism indicate mental illness is a 





I measure stable employment dichotomously to capture whether an extremist 
had a consistent work history. Extremists with stable employment were regularly 
employed prior to extremist mobilization. Extremists who did not have stable 
employment were unemployed, underemployed, or moved between jobs. According 
to Table 1, more than half the far-right extremists in the sample have a stable work 
history. Employment instability has criminological support as a correlate of criminal 
activity (see Chiricos, 1987; Uggen, 2000). The relationship between employment 
stability and extremist violence has mixed support in extant literature as many 
extremists have conventional, stable jobs (Sageman, 2004; Hewitt, 2003). 
Additional control variables are the demographic measures; age, race, and 
gender. Age is established in extant criminological research as related to offending 
(DeLisi & Vaughn, 2016; Farrington, 1986). Age is a continuous variable ranging 
from 10 to 88 in the study sample with a mean age of 38. Race is a dichotomous 
measure of whether the far-right extremist is white or not. In the sample of far-right 
extremists, 95% are white. Finally, gender is measured dichotomously and vast 
majority of extremists in the sample are male.  
Analytical Strategy 
PIRUS was selected for this research because it collects individual-level 
variables widely assumed to be related to radicalization and extremist behavior in the 
United States. Data collected on individuals, their background, and ideological 
activities expands the scope of what terrorism research can study by providing new 





Despite limitations, these data are useful for understanding individual-level 
relationships between extremists and violence.  
Missing data cannot be overlooked in this research. While the dependent and 
independent variables have no known missing data, several of the controls including 
age, race, and criminal history have large numbers of missing observations (see Table 
1). To mitigate the limitations from missing data, I use multivariate imputation by 
chained equations (MICE). MICE has been used on PIRUS data previously (Jasko et 
al., 2017). MICE allows researchers to create multiple datasets from the analysis 
variables and auxiliary variables to estimate values for the missing observations 
(Rubin, 1976). Using those datasets, MICE conducts a series of regressions wherein 
the missing values for each measure are modeled on the known values. By repeating 
this process, a stable estimate is achieved when the estimates converge. Each point is 
the estimated average of the parameter estimate for the imputed datasets (Rubin, 
1987). This means the parameter estimates will be unbiased and the standard errors 
will encompass the sampling and estimation variation (Graham et al., 2007). I use 
MICE through Stata statistical software (2019) to estimate 100 datasets to build the 










Table 3. Correlations with Imputed Data 
 
My analysis into the relationship between ideological affiliation and violence 
starts with bivariate correlations of the independent and dependent measures. 
Multivariate analysis is then conducted using binomial logistic regression (logit), with 
the variable “Violent” as a binary outcome. This test estimates the dichotomous 
outcome of violence or nonviolence based on the dichotomous independent variable 
of multiple sub-ideologies versus single sub-ideologies and the various control 
variables. Overall, this strategy will allow for an important step, no matter how small, 
in understanding if individual ideological affiliations have a relationship with violent 
extremist behavior.  










Employment Male Age White 
Violent 1                    
Multiple 
Ideology -0.017 1                   
Mental Health 0.054 0.037 1                  
Radical Friends 0.074 0.028 -0.202 1                 
Previous 
Criminal 
History 0.118 -0.078 0.109 0.032 1                
Stable 
Employment -0.104 -0.011 -0.130 0.012 -0.138 1               
Male 0.044 0.033 0.039 0.002 0.129 -0.025 1              
Age -0.094 0.098 -0.002 -0.084 0.017 0.095 -0.006 1             





Chapter 4: Results 
In this chapter, I examine the results of the bivariate and multivariate analysis. 
I first consider the bivariate relations between violence and multiple sub-ideologies 
and the control variables. I then discuss the results of the multivariate analysis. 
Bivariate Results 
The bivariate results, presented in Table 4, are not statistically significant, but 
weakly oppose my hypothesis at the bivariate level. Far-right extremists with multiple 
ideologies were less likely to engage in violence than single ideology extremist peers. 
Three control variables were significantly correlated with a higher propensity for 
violence. Far-right extremists with a previous criminal history were more likely to 
engage in violence than peers with no criminal history. Stable employment was 
negatively related to violence: far-right extremists lacking stable employment were 
more likely to use violence than peers with stable employment. Similarly, the younger 
far-right extremists were, the more likely they were to engage in violence.  
Table 4. Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables and Dependent 
Variable (Violent)  
Variable Correlation Coefficient 
Multiple Ideology -0.018   
Controls    
Mental Health 0.054   
Radical Friends 0.079   
Previous Criminal History 0.125**   
Stable Employment  -0.118*   
Male 0.044   
Age  -0.093**   
White 0.016     






 Table 5 presents the multivariate results from the logistic regression to test my 
hypothesis that multiple ideology far-right extremists will have a greater propensity 
for violence than single ideology peers. The model finds that there is not statistically 
significant relationship between participation in multiple ideologies and engagement 
in extremist violence. The measures that are significantly related to extremist violence 
in the model are radical peers, previous criminal history, and age. The presence of 
radical friends increases the odds of violence 1.2 times. Furthermore, the odds of 
violence are 1.5 times higher for far-right extremists with a criminal history. As the 
age of the far-right extremist increases, the odds of violence decreases by 1.2%.  
Table 5. Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable (Violent) 
Independent Variables Beta Odds Ratio Robust SE 
Multiple Ideology -0.054 0.947 0.181 
Controls    
Mental Health 0.316 1.372 0.223 
Radical Friends 0.166* 1.181 0.076 
Previous Criminal History 0.414* 1.513 0.192 
Stable Employment -0.349 0.705 0.269 
Male 0.243 1.275 0.297 
Age  -0.012* 0.988 0.005 
White 0.267 1.306 0.349 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 Note: SE is the abbreviation for standard error. 
 
Summary of Results 
 Overall, I do not find support for my hypothesis. The findings are not 
statistically significant and contrary to my hypothesis according to differential 





in understanding the importance of adhering to multiple ideologies on engaging in 





Chapter 5:  Discussion 
  
Preliminary analysis indicates that multiple ideological affiliations among far-
right extremists are not significantly related to violence. The relationship to violence 
is primarily driven by extremist peers, previous criminal activity, and the age of the 
far-right extremist. I examine this phenomenon using quantitative data at the 
individual level using criminological theory, which has theoretical, practical, and 
policy contributions regardless of the findings. In the following sections I discuss the 
theoretical considerations of why the relationship was not statistically significant 
between multiple ideological affiliations and violence. I then detail the limitations of 
this study, summarize my research, and conclude by exploring future research that 
could further illuminate the emerging phenomenon of multiple ideological affiliations 
in extremism.  
Theoretical Considerations 
Based on differential association theory, I argued that affiliation with multiple 
extremist sub-ideologies would be related to a greater propensity for violence as a 
result of a greater amount of excess definitions and attitudes in favor of violence 
when compared to single sub-ideology peers. While my research is not a perfect test 
of differential association, the theory provides a useful framework for understanding 
how multiple sub-ideologies may provide extremists with excessive definitions in 
favor of violence. Intimate peer groups are an essential part of the differential 
association process (Sutherland, 1947). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the presence 





there has been some past discussion on the specificity of differential association to 
particular crime types (see Jackson et al., 1986; Sutherland, 1947; Thomas, 2018), it 
is possible that far-right extremist ideologies are not differentially related to violent 
and non-violent outcomes. Instead, the extremist definitions are related to 
engagement in extremism, regardless of behavior type. Furthermore, it could be that 
exposure to definitions favorable to violence from multiple ideological sources do not 
present significantly more differential associations than exposure to one ideology.  
Past criminal activity is a known predictor for violent extremism (see Jensen 
et al., 2018; LaFree et al., 2018 for discussion). Those individuals with a criminal 
history may have a lower threshold for engagement in violence if they had past 
experience with violence or breaking the law. The relationship between age and 
criminal involvement has long been acknowledged in criminology (Farrington, 1986). 
Younger individuals are more likely to engage in crime than older individuals, which 
is consistent with the observed negative relationship in my findings (Delisis & 
Vaughn, 2016). 
Ideological ambiguity and lack of commitment could also help explain the 
relationship, or lack thereof, between far-right extremists with multiple ideologies and 
violence. Asal and colleagues’ (2015) examination of terrorist organizations found 
that groups with single ideologies had more ideological clarity than groups with 
multiple ideologies. Ideological clarity, which provides extremist adherents in 
terrorist organizations with focused ideological motivations for violence in a clear 
context (Chou, 2016), was associated with more extremist violence than extremist 





extremist group (Olzak, 2016). The same relationship may be true for extremist 
individuals with multiple sub-ideologies. An internal lack of ideological clarity could 
contribute to unfocused motivations for violence and therefore a lower propensity to 
engage in violence than extremist peers with a singular ideological focus. 
Limitations 
The limitations of PIRUS, while not wholly unique to the dataset, present 
several challenges. As an open-source dataset, the sample of far-right extremists is 
not completely random; the extremists are included in PIRUS because they became 
known as a result of their radical activities or affiliations. Their ideological actions or 
affiliations had to be significant enough to draw the attention of the criminal justice 
system or news media. This limits the generalizability of the findings beyond any 
extremist who has been radicalized within the United States and identified as a result 
of their radicalization. Furthermore, there is likely a bias in the data toward violence 
because violent extremism draws more media attention than non-violent extremism 
(Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). Because the PIRUS data are incomplete, there could 
be missing critical individual factors contributing to the relationship between far-right 
extremists, multiple sub-ideologies, and violent mobilization. Ideological sub-
categorization is based on what was reported in open sources and thus is subject to 
validity errors. For instance, coding or reporting errors could lead to mistaken 
ideological categorization. Additionally, open sources may not report all ideological 
motivations resulting in missing instances of multiple ideologies which are instead 





therefore does not account for ideological change over time. Finally, coding is 
retrospective, making temporal order difficult to establish.  
The PIRUS data are collected from open sources and so information on 
specific topics may not appear if those topics were not part of the available 
information. For example, the measure for radical peers has approximately 40% 
missing values in the complete dataset (LaFree et al., 2018). To my research’s 
benefit, the variable for violent outcome has no missing data. That being said, these 
limitations are inherent in most terrorism research, including case studies and 
interviews. Eliminating cases with missing data would result in a very small sample 
size that would preclude multivariate analysis. Past applications of MICE to PIRUS 
(Jasko et al., 2017) have eliminated measures with over 80% values missing, but 
because my research did not meet that threshold, I did not remove any measures from 
my model. Jasko et al. (2017) conducted additional analyses of their missing data to 
test the impact of MICE on their results and found the pattern and significance of 
their findings remained the same. There are methodological trade-offs in my research 
as there are in criminological research generally. The limits to open-source data have 
corresponding limitations in other methods such as surveys or qualitative case studies.  
Despite the limitations of these data, of which nearly all terrorism research is 
prone to, PIRUS is a critically important dataset. Given the difficulties involved in 
collecting terrorism data, particularly domestic terrorism wherein the First 
Amendment protects privacy and liberty of extremists, these data are crucial to 
understanding terrorist behavior. Limitations of PIRUS do not preclude its usefulness 





level characteristics of extremists within the United States. PIRUS is groundbreaking 
in its inclusion of both violent and non-violent extremists as well as measuring a 
multitude of ideologies (Jensen et al., 2016). The wealth of data and measures 
contained within PIRUS make it an invaluable resource for studying relationships 
between individual-level measures and extremism, contributing to progress both in 
criminological research and policy.  
Summary and Future Directions 
My research seeks to clarify the complex relationship between terrorist 
violence and ideology by exploring how multiple ideological affiliations relate to 
violent outcomes for far-right extremists in the United States. Differential association 
theory is utilized to examine if multiple ideological affiliations are related to a greater 
propensity for violence than single ideology peers. I hypothesize that extremists with 
multiple sub-ideologies will exhibit a higher propensity for violence as they may be 
exposed to a greater amount of excess definitions in favor of violence than single sub-
ideology peers. A foundational understanding of the relationship between ideological 
adherence and violence was accomplished through the use of the open source 
generated dataset, PIRUS. Bivariate logistic regression of violent outcomes on 
multiple ideological sub-categories tested if the presence of more than one ideological 
belief system increased the likelihood of mobilization to violence. While the common 
problems that plague terrorism research are also present in this study, as well as 
problems unique to the PIRUS data, I address these limitations as completely as 
possible. While my research did not find support for my hypothesis, there is potential 





open source data sources become increasingly aware of the phenomenon of multiple 
extremist ideologies (ADL “Hybrid Hate”), the data collected by PIRUS will likely 
improve, warranting additional empirical study. 
My research falls short of adequately exploring the true relationship between 
multiple ideological affiliations and violence among far-right extremists in the United 
States. The ultimate goal of my thesis was to be a preliminary foray into the 
phenomenon of multiple ideologies and to serve as a launching pad for additional 
quantitative research. Future research examining multiple sub-ideologies should 
consider a wider range of ideologies than those from the far-right, such as far-left, 
single issue, and Islamist. Researchers should also consider extremists outside the 
United States; other countries have reported incidents of extremist violence 
perpetrated by actors with multiple ideological affiliations as evidenced by the 
Christchurch, New Zealand shooter. Furthermore, researchers should delve deeper 
into the interactions between multiple ideological affiliations and other factors 
predicting extremist violence to determine if multiple sub-ideologies are a moderating 
factor. The relationship between multiple ideological affiliations and propensity for 
violence is likely more complex than my research accounts for, and future research 
should pay careful attention to interactive effects with other measures related to 
extremist violence.  
Improving the quality and types of data used to examine the relationship 
between multiple sub-ideologies and propensity for violence is another suggestion for 
future research. As improved data on multiple ideological affiliations become 





ideologies an extremist is affiliated with and how invested they are in a particular 
ideology, which could illuminate if frequency or investment in ideology affects 
propensity for violence. Tying quantitative data with qualitative case studies to better 
understand how extremists move in and out of ideological affiliations would provide 
additional insight into what impact that may have on propensity for violence. 
Qualitative life course data would help show how extremists potentially move 
through ideological affiliations, particularly how they engage with multiple 
ideological communities and move between ideologies. Case data would also be 
helpful for identifying the different ideological definitions in favor of violence 
extremists received from ideological affiliations. The method adjustment of pairing 
quantitative and qualitative data will also allow researchers to identify whether 
extremists are holding multiple ideological affiliations concurrently or consecutively.  
My research provides a few contributions to the study of far-right extremism 
and theoretical applications of differential association. The use of differential 
association to empirically study extremism contributes to a growing body of work 
that thus far has been largely conceptual. Furthermore, my research is a novel 
application of differential association theory to explore if multiple sources of 
definitions favorable to violence from different ideological affiliations impact 
propensity for violence. Quantitative tests of differential association for offense 
specific outcomes, violent extremism in the case of my research, contributes to the 
growing body of literature on the theory regarding specificity of definitions. Finally, 





of the data and contributes to the growing body of criminological literature that 
examines extremism. 
Policy and practical contributions of my research include contributions to 
literature on risk factors of extremist violence. Organizations that investigate 
extremism and inform counter-extremism policy are more likely to be successful 
when using empirically validated information regarding extremist risk factors. My 
null findings contribute to that effort by providing preliminary results that multiple 
ideological affiliations do not impact propensity for violence in a statistically 
significant manner. Organizations such as the FBI (Alcoke, 2019) and ADL (ADL 
“Hybrid Hate”) have acknowledged far-right extremists with multiple ideological 
affiliations engaging in violence, but have not been able to say whether that pattern is 
associated with a greater risk of violence. 
To my knowledge, there is no other research that examines the role multiple 
ideological affiliations play in an extremist’s propensity for violence. As a relatively 
rare event, terrorism nonetheless presents a critical topic to be studied as a form of 
crime, an intersection of political science and sociology, and a public safety threat. 
This is an area that research has not yet fully explored, presenting an exciting 
challenge to researchers from all disciplines. Furthermore, the findings from such 
work can have a direct impact on practitioner ability to understand and respond to 
domestic extremist violence. Research serves as an essential tool in policymaker and 
practitioner toolboxes for understanding and proactively mitigating far-right 
extremism. The consequences of terrorism, big or small, can impact a community for 





enforcement in risk assessment and in policy making. We need to understand what 
the potential risk factors for violence are to design and implement effective policies to 
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